This Article was published in
The Frontier Post (February 07, 2010)
The Frontier Post (Print Version) (February 07, 2010)
By Sahibzada Hussain Mohi-ud-Din Qadri
In Pakistan, February 5 is observed as a Kashmir Solidarity Day nationally every
year. Seminars, workshops and demonstrations are held to highlight the plight of
the Kashmiris suffering from the Indian occupation for last 63 years and tribute
is paid to their undying courage and determination for standing up to the overwhelming
Indian military might. The Day also symbolizes the natural association and expression
of support from the people of Pakistan for their Kashmiri brethren. It also reminds
the international community of its commitment to enable the Kashmiri people to get
their right to self determination as mandated by the resolutions of the United Nations,
a commitment that has not yet been fulfilled.
Instead of turning this Day into a mere ritual which it has, we need to focus
on its essential message and get our act together. Some questions naturally come
to mind. Can an unstable and economically weak Pakistan project the case of Kashmir
in a befitting manner? Has Pakistan any coherent Kashmir policy? Does Pakistan have
the ability to move beyond its traditional position in tandem with demands of time
and ground realities? Has Pakistan's policy to use religious groups as a proxy in
Kashmir advanced the Kashmir cause? Why has Pakistan lost broad international support
on the Kashmir issue despite its morally, legally and politically justified stance
on it? Does Islamabad's apologetic and reactive attitude vis-à-vis New Delhi advance
its strategic interest? Answers to these questions represent a crucial test of our
collective ability to respond to the foreign policy challenges on the disputed question
of Kashmir. What options does the Pakistani establishment have to change the status
quo? While we spend the day eulogizing the sacrifices rendered by the Kashmiris,
it is high time we also introspected ourselves with utmost objectivity at our disposal
with a view to determining the pros and cons of our policy choices on the Kashmir
issues. Following points are instructive in that regard:
The ongoing wave of political instability, economic meltdown, and decay of state
institutions is eating into the vitals of our body politic. Islamabad's engagement
in eliminating domestic terror, though a step in the right direction, is also producing
a deadly backlash, thereby upping the ante for the country. Unfortunately Pakistan
happens to be a classic case study in bad management, personalized & unaccountable
style of governance with no rules of the game, nepotism & favouritsm, corruption
and unending power bickering between so-called political parties and military-led
establishment. To top it all, Pakistan has a highly centralized political system
with little autonomy for the federating units. The clash between federation and
provinces over a whole range of subjects is also at the heart of our weakening polity.
Despite the political system being parliamentary as declared by the Constitution,
it is presidential in essence, for most of the powers are vested in the office of
the president.
This sorry state of affairs Pakistan is mired in undermines its negotiating power
vis-à-vis India on Kashmir and other disputed questions. It also sends a negative
message to the Kashmiris about the kind of political arrangement they would have
if they get to accede to Islamabad in case of political settlement of the issue.
Pakistan's Kashmir policy has also been suffering from systematic flaws in that
it has been more whimsical and less institutional. Every ruler of the day has had
different and incoherent approach to the Kashmir question dictated more by his political
compulsions than regional contexts. There has not been much of civilian input into
the policy, which has been considered to be sole preserve of military and intelligence
apparatus to the exclusion of parliament. The older generation of the Pakistani
political and military leaders has gradually lost space to India to maneuver the
international opinion in its favour by diluting Pakistan's stated position. They
have been less creative and more status quo-prone wedded to the world of make-believe.
The ruling elites have also been found wanting in keeping a pace with changing regional
and international demands and coming up with proactive response to cope up with
the new realities.
The establishment's policy to use religious groups as a proxy to advance its
interests in Kashmir has done more harm than good to the Kashmir cause and Pakistan's
position on it. The 1989 Kashmir movement, which was purely indigenous in character,
represented the demonstration of people's natural urge to determine their political
future and rise against the Indian military domination. This movement won broad
international support besides highlighting the centrality of Kashmir as the major
factor in achieving stability in a highly volatile region that is South Asia. It
also put India on the defensive on international diplomatic plane.
However, the intrusion of religious groups from across the border provided India
with a lever to justify its domination and beat the drum about the irrelevance of
the UN resolution on Kashmir in the wake of change in "ground realities". These
groups ended up hijacking the indigenous movement for freedom and self-determination.
Their patrons who collected finances and found new recruits carved out a new role
in the political landscape of the country with the full connivance of the establishment,
which was ever eager to dilute the hold of mainstream political parties. The newfound
empowerment of the religious parties enabled them to develop their own agenda informed
by their sectarian and ideological associations. The "bleed India" policy of the
extremist groups was more than manifests in their oversees operations. In hitting
the Indian symbols of prestige and power, they have not necessarily worked with
the backing of their patrons. In their attempts to expand their 'sphere of influence',
the militant religious organizations have also tended to suppress and eliminate
all symbols of resistance from the Kashmiri nationalist forces who were apprehensive
of the intentions of these groups and saw in their working the danger of a superimposed
religious order defined by strong sectarian connections.
Following the catastrophic events of 9/11, India was able to invoke the international
community's obsession with terrorism and paint Pakistan as a breeding ground of
terror through its robust diplomatic offensive. This led to evaporation of international
support for Pakistan's principled stand on Kashmir.
Now the questions arise: will Pakistan continue to ignore its social and economic
development by spending its meager resources on its defence? Will the initiative
to pass the gospel word on Kashmir stay in the hands of security establishment without
the inclusion of elected representatives? Is the UN still a credible institution
capable of delivering solution to the Kashmir issue in the light of its resolutions
after its total failure in reining in the US in recent times? Do we have the imagination
to think out of box and agree to the resolution of the Kashmir problem along lines
different from what has traditionally been put down our throats over the decades?
Can Line of Control be declared and accepted as international border? Is settlement
of Kashmir possible on the basis of demography and religion? Is an independent acceptable
to India and Pakistan?
While we observe February 5 as Kashmir Solidarity Day and rightly pay homage
to the sacrifices of our Kashmiri brethren, we should also do some soul-searching
on our past conduct. Only an economically strong, peaceful and politically stable
Pakistan can protect the rights of the Kashmiris, force India to the negotiating
table and evoke international interest and role.
(The writer is a PhD candidate at an Australian University)